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WHAT CONSTITUTES A FAIR PROCEDURE BEFORE
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Clyde W. Summers*

N

O administrative body in recent times has received as much
criticism, both favorable and unfavorable, as has the National
Labor Relations Board in its administration of the National Labor
Relations Act.1 Such a vast amount of material has been written on
the procedure before the board that any further discussion would seem
superB.uous.2 However, the discussion of the board's procedure has
been related more to the wisdom of choice which the board has made
in setting up its procedure than to a determination of the line that
separates legality from illegality in its determination of cases.
The author has sought to determine from the published decisions
of the boards and from the cases before the Supreme Court and the
Circuit Courts of Appeals 4 what the boundaries· are that divide fair
from unfair proced_ure. The principles derived from the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment are applicable, and the act specifically
provides for a procedure which complies with the principles of due
process. 5 But more than that should be required of administrative tribunals if they are to gain popular respect and confidence. They should
be held to standards of fairness based on equal rights and impartiality
in all stages of the proceeding.
In attempting to determine what the board and the courts feel is
a fair procedure, the decisions of the board are of little help. The
* Instructor in Law, University of Toledo, Ohio. B.S., J.D., University of
Illinois.-Ed.
1 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 151 et seq.
2 The best discussion of the board's procedure is the Monograph on the National
Labor Relations Board in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:
MONOGRAPHS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), pt. 5 (hereinafter cited as "Administrative Procedure Monograph"). One of the most helpful criticisms of that
procedure from the practical standpoint is Gellhorn and Linfield, "Politics and Labor
Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of N. L. R. B. Procedure," 39 CoL. L. REv.
339 ( 1939) ·
3 Volumes 1-25 covering all decisions up to August 1, 1940.
4 All Supreme Court cases up to 63 S. Ct. 206 (December 15, 1942), and all
circuit court cases up to 131 F. (2d) 112 (December 14, 1942).
5 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937).
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issues on procedural points are not clearly defined, the facts are not
fully stated, and the reasoning on which the board bases its conclusions is not given. It is difficult, therefore, to determine just what a
decision holds, predict what may happen in future cases, or work out
any reliable guiding principles. Many of the board decisions cited in
this discussion are cited with the inner fear that the board did not
mean at all what it apparently said.
,
The court decisions are somewhat better, but one has the lurking
suspicion that often behind all of the abstract generalizations of the
court lies an unexpressed major premise qased on the judge's personal
philosophy of the wisdom of administrative justice or the basic purposes of the act. However, there are many well-defined rules which
the courts mechanically follow, and many other more intangible rules
which give clues as to what the courts may do in the future. Decisions
concerning other tribunals have not been examined, although they
might shed some light on the decisions concerning the Labor Board.
However, the kind of procedure that will be fair depends to a large
degree upon the nature of the issues being litigated and the relationship between the parties in the litigation. Here the board is charged
with the settling of disputes between labor and capital under circumstances of great emotional tension and according to principles that have
only recently been established in this country. Its procedure must
accordingly provide greater safeguards and some of a sort different
from those provided by other tribunals.
It is the purpose of this discussion to follow the complaint procedure of the board step by step from the filing of the charge to the
issuing of the order and to state the principles and rules which have
been established at each step. The procedure in representation pro:-,
ceedings is not discussed because it is primarily investigatory and gives
little help in determining the attributes of a fair hearing.
The ordinary complaint case begins with the filing with the board
of a charge by a union against an employer, charging the employer
with certain violations of the act. The respondent is served with a
complaint stating the charges against him 6 and the time when a hearing will be held on the charges. The hearing is held before a trial
examiner with the regional attorney attempting to prove the allegations in the complaint and the respondent attempting to disprove them.
At the end of the hearing, the trial examiner draws up his recommen6 Although the respondent is often a corporation and only occasionally a human
being, the third person masculine singular pronoun will usually be used to refer to a
respondent, corporate or human.
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dations in an intermediate report and transfers this with the record of
the hearing to the board. After the consideration of briefs filed by both
parties, and after the hearing of oral argument, the board makes its
findings of fact and order. If the respondent fails to comply with the
order, the board asks for an enforcement order from the circuit court
of appeals, which then reviews the proceeding and the evidence. If
the court grants the enforcement order, subsequent noncompliance by
the respondent constitutes contempt.
There are three main stages in the entire process: the pre-hearing
stage involving the problems of the requirements in pleading and the
joinder of parties; the hearing stage involving the problems of obtaining and presenting evidence before the trial examiner, the formation of an unbiased record, and the making of the intermediate report;
and the decision stage involving the problems as to who must make
the decision, on what it must be based, and the scope of the order.

I
PLEADINGS AND PARTIES

A. Pleadings
The pleadings in the procedure before the board consist of the
charge, which gives the board notice of a violation of the act and gives
it jurisdiction to act; the complaint, which serves notice on the respondent of the institution of formal action; and the answer, which
gives the board notice of the respondent's intended defenses. The
pleadings here are informal in nature and are not intended to define
a ca.use of action, but only to give the parties an adequate opportunity
to prepare for the hearing. No party can complain of defects in the
pleading unless he can show that he was injured thereby.

r. The Charge
The board has no power to institute proceedings of its own motion,
but can obtain jurisdiction over unfair practices only when a charge
has been filed with it.7 The board's rules and regulations authorized by
the act 8 provide the rules for the filing of charges.
A charge may be filed by any person or labor organization 9
N. L. R. A., § 10 (b); Consumers Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th,
1940) 113 F. (2d) 38.
7

8

N. L. R. A.,§ 6.

Rules and Regulations (1940), art. II, § I. Also published in 4
3155 (1939), as amended by 5 id. 317, 1046 (1940).
9

FED.

REG.
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whether parties to the dispute or not.10 It must be in writing, signed
and sworn to,11 must contain the name and address of the one filing
the charge and of the one against whom the charge is filed and contain
a statement of the facts alleged to constitute the unfair labor practices,12
and must be filed with the regional director for. the region in which the
practice occurred.13
•
The charge will give the board jurisdiction even though it fails
to comply with the board's own rules as long as there is substantial
satisfaction of the safeguards.14 Since the rules for the filing of charges
are designed primarily to protect the board against proceeding on unwarranted charges, the respondent cannot ordinarily rely on defects
in the charge. The board has jurisdiction to proceed even though the
charge is not sworn to 15 and the charging union has not signed properly
so long as there is no mistake as to its real identity.16 Likewise the misnaming of the respondent is not error if he receives notice and appears.17 If there is a failure to comply with the board's rules in any
respect, the board can in its own discretion refuse to assume jurisdiction.
The charge need not set out the facts with particularity, but only
sufficiently to inform the board of the subject matter which is to be
investigated and on which the complaint is to be issued.18 The charge
can be amended to make it more particular or to add new matters
discovered at any time before final adjudication by the b6ard.19
Since the board's function is not only to adjudicate the private
rights of 'the parties, but also to protect the public's rights, once a
charge has been filed, it is the duty of the board to protect the public
interest. The charge cari be withdrawn only with the consent of the
board 20 and it can refuse to allow withdrawal even though the
10 Matter of Washougal Woolen Mills, 2 3 ·~. L. R. B. l ( l 940). Even though
the union which filed the charge was nonexistent at the time of filing the amended
charge, the charge is good as it purports to be by a union and can also be treated as
being filed by an individual. Matter of'Universal Match Corp., 23 N. L. R. B. 226
(1940).
11 Rules and Regulations, art. II, § 3.
12 Id., § 4.
13 Id., § 2.
14 Consumers Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 38;
Matter of Diamond T Motor Car Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 204 ( 1940).
15 N. L. R. B. v. J. S. Popper, Inc., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) u3 F. (2d) 602.
16 N. L. R. B. v. Vincennes Steel Corp., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) u7 F. (2d) 169.
17 Matter of Aluminum Ore Co., 8 N. L. ~: B. 914 (1938).
18 Matter of Beckerman Shoe Corp., 19 N. L. R. B. 820 (1940).
19 Matter of Armour & Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 682 (1939); Matter of Diamond T
Motor Car Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 204 (1939). The ability to amend will be dealt
with in more detail under the heading of complaint.
zo Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 1.
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charging party claims that all differences have been settled.21 However, the board will usually permit withdrawal of the charge without
prejudice and with the right of the charging party to petition for
reinstatement. 22 If withdrawal after the hearing and the filing of the
intermediate report is granted ,with the reservation to reinstate, the
determination on reinstatement can be made according to the record
prior to the withdrawal unless there is a showing of injury by the
passage of an unreasonable time.2 3
2.

The Complaint

(a) Investigation
After the charge has been filed, the case is assigned to a field
examiner for investigation to determine whether the charge is justified
and whether the board has jurisdiction.24 The field examiner gathers
all of the relevant facts available, interviews the parties, and arranges
for a joint conference between the parties.25 As a result of this investigation the charges may be withdrawn by the union or a settlement
reached. If the case is not disposed of in this way and the regional
director feels the charge is unjustified, he may decline to issue a complaint, his'refusal being subject to review by the board.20 The investigation is of utmost importance, for one-fourth of all complaint charges
are withdrawn, one-half settled, and one-sixth dismissed at this stage.27
In r939-r940, formal proceedings were had on only eleven per cent
of the complaint cases fi.led. 28

· (b) Issuance of the Complaint
If the case cannot be otherwise disposed of, the regional director
must request the issuance of a formal complaint by the board.29 The
21

N. L. R. B. v. Prettyman, (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 786.
Matter of C. G. Conn, Ltd., 7 N. L. R. B. 337 (1938) (withdrawn when
the Carter Coal case threw doubts '?n the constitutionality of the act, reinstated after
the act had been held constitutional).
23
C. G. Conn, Ltd., v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390.
24 Subpoenas may be issued to determine whether the acts charged affect commerce even though no complaint has been issued. N. L. R. B. v. Barrett Co., (C. C. A.
7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 583; but the party charged is not entitled to a hearing on
whether there is sufficient grounds to warrant an investigation, Matter of Gate City
Cotton Mills, 1 N. L. R. B. 57 (1935).
25
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH 4-5 (1941).
26 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 9.
21
1936 N.L.R. B., ANNUAL REPORT 35-36; 1937 id. 20-21; 1938 id. 30-31;
1940 id. 16-17.
28
1940 id. 16.
29 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 5.
22
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complaint is the formal notice of the proceedings and the facts in issue
and must be served on the parties. It may be served personally, by
registered mail, or by telegraph,3° anywhere in the United States.31
It should be served on the respondent at his place of business,82 but if
it is served on the respondent's attorney and the respondent had
actual knowledge of the complaint, th.e notice is good. 33
The time of issuing the complaint is at the discretion of the
board; 34 delay' of one or two years after the commission of the acts
complained of will not constitute !aches,35 give the court the right to
modify the order,86 or constitute a constructive declination to issue the
complaint.37 The rules provide that the complaint must be served at
least ten days before the date set for the hearing, 38 but a failure to
comply with the rules will not void the proceedings where there is
no showing of prejudicial injury from a lack of time to prepare. 39
The respondent cannot claim prejudice if it answers the complaint
without asking for an extension.40 If the ten day notice is not given
and the respondent objects, an extension must be granted or a new
hearing will be ordered.41
The rules provide that a copy of the charge upon which the complaint is based shall be attached to the complaint.42 The respondent
cannot demand that the original charge be attached 43 but the attaching
of a copy of the amended charges is sufficient compliance with the
rules. 44 If no charge at all is attached, then the complaint will probably
be held bad,45 although such action is not necessarily injuriou~, for the
N. L. R. A., § II (4).
N. L. R. B. v. Hearst, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) l02 F. (2d) 658 (service in a
region other than the one in which the complaint was issued).
32
N. L. R. A., § I I (4).
83
Matter of Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 448 (1939).
84 Berkshire Employees Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
235 (even though there was intentional delay for the convenience of the union).
35
Matter of Charles Banks Stout, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (1939).
36
N. L. R. B- v. Wilson Line, (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 809.
37
Matter of Bussmann Mfg. Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 322 (1939).
38
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 5. The act requires only 5 days notice.
N. L. R. A., § 10 (b).
89
N. L. R. B. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 98
F. (2d) 488 (notice of 6 days).
40
Matter of Lone Star Bag Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938) (notice of 3 days);
Matter of National Candy Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 1207 (1938).
41
Matter of Lane Cotton Mills, 9 N. L. R. B. 952 (1938).
42
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 5.
48 Matter of L. C. Smith & Corona Typewriters, II N. L. R. B. 1382 (1939).
44
Matter of National Meter Co., II N. L. R. B. 320 (1939).
45
N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98" F. (2d) 97
at 102 (semble).
30

31

1 94.d
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issues tried at the hearing are based on the allegations in the complaint
rather than on the charges.46 However, to allow the board to disregard
its own rules 47 adds an air of unfairness to the whole proceeding. Mere
technical violations of the rules should not necessitate voiding the
whole proceeding, but the board cannot hope to gain the confidence
of those who come before it if it fails to live up to its own regulations.

(c) Sufficiency of Complaint
Section IO (b) of the act provides that "Whenever it is charged
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practices, the Board . . . shall have power to issue . . . a complaint
stating the charges in that respect...." This clause does not limit the
board's jurisdiction to the matters specifically stated in the charge.
The allegations in the complaint need not conform to the charges,48
nor need the evidence be restricted to the matters charged,49 but the
charge will usually be amended to conform to the complaint and to
the evidence in order to avoid any possible procedural defects. 50 The
board, by issuing the complaint can, in e:ffect, expand the charge without waiting for the union to amend. 51
The complaint here has the sole function of giving notice of the
issues that are to be tried and need not be as definite as a pleading in
law or equity. It need not specify any particular incidents, 52 nor state
the names, date, or places involved 58 as long as it gives an adequate
opportunity to all parties to prepare their evidence and cross-examination. There will be no reversal unless there is a showing of actual
prejudice by lack of notice. If the respondent does not ask for a bill
of particulars or for an adjournment but puts in evidence to meet that
46

Matter of Lone Star Bag Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938).
N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) n8 F. (2d)
780 at 788-789 ("There is a suggestion that the complaint violates the Board's rules,
but we assume that since the Board has the power to make the rules it has power to
suspend them").
48
Matter of Titmus Optical Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 1026 (1938).
49
Matter of Shell Petroleum Co., IO N. L. R. B. 719 (1938) (charge of interference with unionization; complaint and evidence included preference of nonunion
members).
50
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH II, note 47 (1941).
51
Matter of Killefer Mfg. Co., 22 N. L. R. B. 484 (1940).
52
Consumers Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 38;
N. L. R. B. v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 552.
53
N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 118 F. (2d)
780; Swift & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 87.
54
N. L. R. B. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 114 F. (2d)
376.
47
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'of the board's, he cannot claim that he had insufficient notice. 5 "' However, motions for a. bill of particulars or to make the complaint more
definite and specific will usually be denied on the condition that the
respondent will be granted a continuance in case he is surprised,55 or
that he will be allowed to recall witnesses for cross-examination,56 or
allowed an adjournment at the close of the board's case to obtain time
to prepare rebuttal. 57 The denial of the motions on these- conditions is
held not to deny a fair hearing unless there is a showing of real surprise. 58 This will not usually work a hardship on the respondent,
because, after the interviews and conferences of the preliminary investigation, he is aware of the facts relied on the charge. In addition
the 'hearing is by intervals sufficient to ordinarily give opportunity to
prepare for the unexpected evidence. 59 It is submitted that there is
little reason to deny motions made in good faith for more information
on the issues. Though there may be no prejudice resulting from the
denial, it can only serve to antagonize those who come before the
board.

( d) Amendments of Complaints
The complaint may be amended at any time before the issuance
of an order by the board eo and the respondent is not entitled to five
days after the amendment to file his amended answer or prepare his
case. He is entitled only to that time which is reasonably necessary.61
The allowance of only one day to answer ari amended complaint may
be sufficient 02 if the respondent is unable to show he has not had time
to prepare.63 If he fails to ask for a continuance and enters the evidence,
then he cannot claim surprise.6 The complaint may be amended at any
,1,

5

Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, 20 N. L. R. B. IIOO (1940).
Matter of John A. Roebling's Sons Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 482 (1939).
57
Matter of Midlands Steel Products Co., II N. L. R. B. 1214 (1939).
58
Valley Mould & Iron Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II6 F.
(2d) 760.
59
See N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862
at 873.
60
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 7; Matter of Henry Glass & Co., 21 N. L. R. B.
727 (1940) (amendment after intermediate report and oral argument before the
board); Matter of Capitol Theater •Bus Terminal, 16 N. L. R. B. 104 (1939)
(amendment :five months after hearing to make specific a general allegation of discriminatory discharge) •
61
Matter of Quality Art Novelty Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 817 (1940) (evidence on
amended matter not entered for four days).
'
62
M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 432.
63
Matter of Lane Cotton Mills, 9 N. L. R. B. 952 (193'8).
6
"' Matter of Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 989 (1940);
Mattel" of Diamond T Motor Car Co., 18 N. J;,. R. B. 204 (1939).
·t

56
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time and from time to time· during the hearing to conform to the evidence presented, and at the end of the hearing to conform to all of the
evidence. 65 Amendments will be permitted to state correctly the names
of the employees,66 the union, and of the company; 67 to clarify 68 or
extend the bargaining unit contended for,69 and to add names of
workers discriminatorily discharged. 70 Amendments should not be permitted unless there is a definite assurance of a full litigation of the
issues. If the amendment is made during the hearing, there should be
adequate time given to prepare on the new issues. If the amendment
is at the close of the hearing it should not be allowed to include new
issues unless it is clear that both sides have been aware that these issues
were being tried and have had full opportunity to present their
evidence. 71
3. The Answer
The respondent has the right to :file an answer to the complaint
with the regional director within ten days after the service of the complaint,72 or later if granted an extension by the director. 78 The answer
must be in writing, signed and sworn to by the respondent, 74 must
contain a statement of the grounds for defense, and should explain or
deny every allegation in the complaint. Any allegation not specifically
denied may be deemed to be admitted. 75 The answer may be amended
to meet any amendments made to the complaint by the board, or for
any other reason upon the discretion of the board or the trial examiner. 76
65

Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
Matter of Lone Star Bag Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938).
67
Matter of Pacific Greyhound Lines, 9 N. L. R. B. 557 (1938).
68
Matter of Times Publishing Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 1170 (1938).
69
Matter of Aluminum Ore Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 914 (1938).
70 Matter of Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 1073 (1938). But in
Matter of Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N. L. R. B. 267 (1940), it was conditioned
on the trial attorney's agreement to recall the witnesses upon the respondent's request.
71
However, the board has been unwilling to allow amendment of the complaint
to cover issues fully litigated which were inadvertently omitted from the complaint.
See, e.g., Matter of Titmus Optical Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 1026 (1938), but it has
restricted amendments after the hearing to unsubstantial matters.
72 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § IO.
73
Id., § 12.
H Id., § II.
75
Id., § IO.
76
Id., § 13. But the respondent may be allowed to have his original answer
serve as the answer to the amended complaint where the amendment was to add names
of workers discharged. Matter of Montgomery .Ward & Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 539
66

(1938).
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B. The Parties
The parties to the proceedings are of two classes, necessary and
proper. If a party is necessary and is not joined either by being served
notice or by intervention, the order can have no binding effect as to it.
A proper party is one who may be allowed to intervene, or who in
some cases is given notice, but whose participation is not necessary to
the validity of the order.
I.

Necessary Parties

Section IO (b) of the act requires only that notice of hearing be
given to the employer respondent and thereby makes the board and
the respondent the only necessary parties,77 even though others may
be vitally affected by the order. In a hearing on charges for discriminatory discharge, the workers who replaced tbose discharged are not
entitled to intervene even though the reinstatement order may deprive
them of their jobs. 78 In a hearing on charges of refusal to bargain collectively, the workers who are alleged to have been represented by
the union are not entitled to intervene to show that the charging union
does not represent them. 79 The court's rationale of these decisions is
that these persons are not necessary parties because the order does not
run against them. This is, at best, superficial and technical reasoning.
All who are so directly affected should be allowed to present any
evidence which they might have that would protect their interest.
This concept was extended in the Pennsylvania Greyhound case,8°
which held that company-dominated unions were not entitled to notice
in a proceeding which resulted in an order invalidating a contract
between the employer and the union just because th~ order technically
ran against the company and not the union. This was qualified by the
Consolidated Edison ·case,81 which held that if the contracting union
was not fostered or dominated by the employer, the rule did not apply
· and the union was entitled to notice. The circuit courts have all followed this rule that company-dominated unions were n_ot entitled to
77
By N. L. R. A., § IO (b), any other person may be permitted to intervene
on the discretion of the board or the agent conducting the hearing.
78
N. L. R. B. v. Star Publishing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 465.
79
Oughton v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) II8 F. (2d) 486.
80 N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571
(1938).
81
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)
(contract with A. I?. L. union charged as being supported by the company in opposition to C. I. 0. union) ..
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notice and had no right to intervene,82 with the exception of the ninth
circuit, which requires notice to company unions in all cases where the
order is to invalidate the contract or disestablish the union. 88
The distinction that a union is entitled to notice depending on
whether or not it is dominated is unsound. A union is not any less
vitally affected by the order simply because it is dominated. If it is in
fact dominated, then clearly it may be destroyed, but failure to give
notice of the ,hearing which finds that it is dominated is to condemn
it without giving it a chance to acquit i~self. If the contract invalidated
is unfair on its face, an opportunity to present evidence would be superfluous 84 but in all other cases the union should not be deprived of
its property right in a contract or its right of association by orders of
invalidation or disestablishment without a chance to be heard. This
danger is partly alleviated by the provision that notice shall be served
on all unions charged with being dominated and all parties to a contract whose validity is being questioned.85 However, as long as the
board is entitled to ignore its own rules there is no guarantee of a fair
hearing. 86
2. Proper Parties
Even though a party is not entitled to notice according to the above
principles, he may become a party by receiving notice or by intervening.
If the motion to intervene is not in accord with the rules of the
board,87 the motion can be denied on that ground alone,88 but the
82
Reliance Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 125 F. (2d) 3u;
N. L. R. B. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 124 F. (2d)
50; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) u4 F. (2d)
930; N. L. R. B. v. Christian Board of Publication, (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
678; Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 472;
N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 167;
N. L. R. B. v. National Licorice Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 655;
N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 818.
88
N. L. R. B. v. Sterling Electric Motors, (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) u2 F. (2d) 63,
affirming 109 F. (2d) 194 on rehearing; N. L. R. B. v. Cowell Portland Cement Co.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 198.
84
National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U.S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940)
( the contracts were with individual employees and prohibited bargaining for a closed
shop).
85
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 5.
86
The board has also held that one who has no right to intervene is not entitled
to a fair hearing after it becomes a party, Matter of Harrisburg Children's Dress Co.,
14 N. L. R. B. 1035 (1939), but there is serious doubt whether such a ruling will
be supported by the courts.
87
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 19. The motion must be in writing setting
out the grounds of interest, and be signed and sworn to by the intervenor.
88
Matter of De Vilbiss Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 187 (1939) (motion made after
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motion may be granted even though there is a failure to comply with
the rules. 89
Individual employees will be allowed to intervene to protect their
individual interests,90 but they will not be allowed to intervene on behalf of fellow employees without a showing of authorization by the
other employees.91 Even though an individual can show such authorization, there is no error in limiting his intervention to his individual
interest if the interests of all the employees are identical..92 Unions will
not be permitted to intervene unless they show substantial interest 93
and that intervention may be for a limited purpose only.9 Thus where
the charge is one of domination of a company union and other unfair
labor practices, the intervention can be limited to the issue of domination 95 as this is the only issue in which the union has a substantial
interest.
3. Successor Parties
,i,

Because of the protracted nature of 'the hearings,96 the original
respondent may have gone into bankruptcy or receivership. If this
occurs before or during the hearing, the receiver or trustee in bankruptcy may be substituted as respondent by amending the complaint,
be ordered to proceed with the defense, and compelled to comply with
the order.97 If the substitution is made after the hearing, the case will
hearing); Matter of Walt Disney Productions, 13 N. L. R. B. 865 (1939); Matter
of Standard Oil of New Jersey, 8 N. L. R. B. 1094 (1938) (motions made orally at
the hearing and denied by the trial examiner).
89
Matter of Vail-Ballou Press, 15 N. L. R. B. 378 (1939).
90
Matter of Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 12 N. L:R. B. 944 (1939):· Contra:
Matter of John J. Oughton (Windsor Mfg. Co.), 20 N. L. R. B. 301 (1940).
91
Matter of Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 944 (1939).
92
N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) 118 F. (2d)
874, affirming 12 N. L. R. B. 944 (1939).
93
Matter of Calco Chemical Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 34 (1939); Matter of Interstate
Water Co., II N. L. R. B. 417 (1939) (failed to show that it represented any of the
employees or that it had a contract with the respondent).
94
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 19; Matter of Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 7
N. L. R. B. 714 (1938) (company union allowed to show only date of origin, number
it represented, and relationship with employer).
95
Matter of Gutmann Coal Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 64 (1939); Matter of Cudahy
Packing Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 676 (1939); Matter of Consumer's Power Co., 9
N. L. R. B. 701 (1938).
96
The time elapsing between the filing of charges and the rendering of a decision by the board has averaged in past years from 191 days in 1935-36 to 389 days
in 1937-38. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH I, note 3 (1941).
97
N.L.R.B. v. Bachelder, (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 574; Matter of
Hoosier Veneer Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 907 (1940).
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be reopened for the purpose of amending the complaint and giving
the substituted party a chance for further hearing. 98 If the prior party
has violated the act and there is a continuity of interest, the successor
will be bound even though there is no charge that he has violated
the act.99
Sometimes the respondent will attempt to make a fictitious conveyance of its assets in order to cover up a discriminatory discharge
and escape back pay orders. In the first case of that type presented,
the court refused to allow the order to ·run against the successor company because it was not the one charged with the violation but was a
separate entity.100 Later the same court overruled itself by holding
that the successor was guilty of contempt for violating the enforcement
order against its predecessor.101 There is no reason why the successor
should not be bound regardless of the technicalities of the pleadings
as long as it has been given a fair chance to present evidence in its
defense.102
If the charging union is reorganized or has its name changed, the
new union may be substituted for the charging union 103 without giving
the respondent a hearing on the substitution if the new union is in
fact the successor of the charging union.10i If a company union which
is charged with being dominated by the employer is disbanded and a
new union is organized, the new union is bound by any order made
against the old union only if there is actually a continuity of interest
found. 105
4. Consolidation
Because of the great mass of cases before the board,106 it is often
convenient to consolidate related cases and dispose of several at a single
98

Matter of Ryan Car Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 139 (1940).
N. L. R. B. v. Bachelder, (C. ~- A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 574.
.
100
N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 97.
101
N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 104 F.
99

(2d) 302.
102
N. L. R. B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
39; Union Drawn Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 587
(successor brought in during first day of hearing).
103
Matter of Consumers Power Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 701 (1938).
lOi Cudahy Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) I 18 F. (2d) 295.
105
N. L. R. B. v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
815 {new union not a continuation and free of domination); Eagle-Picher Mining
& Smelting Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 903 (new union
merely a disguise for the old one).
106
During the first four years the board handled 22,500 cases, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH I (1941).
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hearing.107 The consolidation may consist of representation and complaint proceedings 108 against the same respondent,1° 0 charges of separate unions against the same employer,110 and charges by the same
union against separate employers. The determination to consolidate is
solely within the discretion of the board and the parties are not entitled
to be heard on this issue.111
Consolidation has the effect of incorporating the record of another
case into the record of the instant case. This saves the retaking of a
vast amount of evidence and enables the board to consider both cases
conjunctively. There is an evident danger that the incorporation may
force the parties to meet some issues for which they are not prepared.
The same length of notice or right to continuance should be granted
here to protect the parties from surprise as is given in cases of amending
the complaint as to matters of substance,112 and the parties should be
given an adequate opportunity to rebut the evidence incorporated.113
A second danger is that the acts in the various incorporated cases will
be so unrelated as to confuse the issues and to prevent a clear understanding of the different cases.

II
THE HEARING

After a charge has been filed, a complaint served, and an answer
made, there must be a hearing to determine the merits of the allegations in the complaint. The hearing is not for the purpose of rendering
a decision at that time but to adduce evidence and compile a record
from which the board can reach a decision and issue the proper order.
Though the order may result in money damages in the form of back
107
See Matter of General Petroleum Corp. of California, 5 N. L. R. B. 982
(1938) (15 cases consolidated).
108
Matter of Henry Glass & Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 727 (1940) (consolidation after
representation proceedings had reached the stage of oral argument).
100
N. L. R. B. v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 122 F.
- (2d) 433·
110
Matter of Block-Friedman Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 625 (1940) (three companies
in Dallas associated on a blacklisting device and dominating a single local union);
Matter of Heyward Granite Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 542 (1939) (five companies in the
same business in the same locality).
111
N. L. R. B. v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 433; Matter of Cudahy Packing Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 302 (1939).
112
Matter of Eagle & Phenix Mills, I I N. L. R. B. 361 (1939) (evidence not
taken on consolidated issues for one week held not to be error where no actual prejudice was shown).
113
Matter of Niles Fire Brick Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 883 (1939).
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pay for employees wrongfully discharged, there is no right to a jury
trial for it is a purely statutory proceeding.114

A. The Trial Examiner
The statute provides that the hearing shall be before the board,
one of its members, or a designated agent or agency.115 Practically all
hearings are now held before the trial examiners employed by the
board. The primary function of the examiner is to make a complete
and accurate record of all of the fact1l from which the board can. make
a fair decision.116 He therefore can and should cross-examine the witness to clarify the testimony,117 call other witnesses, and enter other
documentary evidence of which he may have knowledge. 118 He may
limit cross-examination and exclude irrelevant or incompetent testimony to keep the record down to a reasonable size.110
The second function of a trial examiner is to rule on all motions
made during the hearing as to intervention, amendment of pleadings,
consolidation, issuance of subpoenas, admission of evidence, and dis-·
missal of the complaint. Since he is the agent of the board taking
evidence for their use, he can consult the board for advice on ruling on
these motions.120 On a motion to dismiss, he may reserve his decision
until all evidence is in and rule on it in his intermediate report,121 but
rulings on all other motions should be made before further hearing.
The third function of the trial examiner is to prepare an intermediate report stating his findings of fact and his recommendations
for the disposition of the case. 122 These are only recommendations to
the board and are in no sense binding on it. If there has been an
interruption in the trial and a di:fferent trial examiner assigned to
complete the hearing, neither will be able to make a report, but the
board can take jurisdiction of the case and make an order based on the
record alone.128
114 N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937); Aqwilines v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 87 F. (2d) 146.
115
N. L. R. A., § IO (c).
116
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 23.
117
Subin v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) n2 F. (2d) 326; Cupples Co.
Mfrs. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 100; N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole
Carbon Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 167.
118 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 24.
119
N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862.
12
°
Consumers Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 38.
121
Matter of Times Publishing Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 652 (1939).
122 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 32, as amended 6 FED. REG. 4603 (1941).
128 ,Matter of Condenser Corp. of America, 22 N. L. R. B. 347 (1940); Matter
of Model Blouse Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 133 (1939).
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Perhaps no criticism of the board's procedure has been quite as
vituperative as the criticism that the trial examiners are biased against
the respondent.. Often this charge is made when there has been complete fairness in his conduct at the hearing,124 and in only three cases
have the courts found the trial examiner's bias was so great as to
require a reversal.125
Mere claiming of bias is not enough.126 There must be a pointing
out of specific instances 121 of conduct which work a substantial prejudice.1:8 The mere cross-examination of witnesses, even though it brings
out_evidence unfavorable to the respondent,129 and even though it is
unnecessarily extended 130 is not a ground for reversal. However, if
the cross-examination is hostile or partisan, not being equally searching
on both sides, there is such unfairness as to require a new hearing. m
The showing of feeling,132 expressions of sarcasm,133 impaµence and
abruptness,134 though unbecoming of a judge, are not sufficient if there
is no showing of actual prejudice.185 The mere fact that the trial ex• aminer made erroneous rulings is not sufficient to show bias,136 but if
he is not equally liberal on both sides in the admissiol!- of incompetent
and hearsay evidence, it may show such bias as to require reversal.137
1
H N. L. R. B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
39; Subin v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) n2 F. (2d) 326; Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. N.L.R. B., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 340; Wilson & Co. v.
N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 243.
125
N. L. R. B. v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., ( C. C. A. 9th, 1940) 118
F. (2d) 980; Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9;
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 103 F. (2d) 147.
126
Matter of Union Die-Casting Co., 7 N.L.R.-B. 846 (1938).
127
Matter of Condenser Corp. of America, 22 N. L. R. B. 347 (1940).
128
Cudahy Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 367;
N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862.
129
Jefferson Electric Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 949.
13
°Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 100
(where the trial examiner's questioning of 4 witnesses covered 155 pages).
181
See cases cited supra, note 125 (all three of these cases are good examples of
extreme bias of trial examiner).
182
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 641.
138
N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 167.
184
Matter of Johns-Manville Products Corp., 17 N. L. R. B. 895 (1939).
135
N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905. The
court will look fully into the facts to see if the charges of unfairness are supported by
proof. N. L. R. B. v. Acme-Evans Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 477.
186
Donnelly Garment Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 123 F. (2d)
215; N.L.R.B. v. Luxuray, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 106; Wilson & Co.
v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 243.
187
N. L. R. B. v. Washington Dehydrated Foods Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) 118
F. (2d) 980.
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The board itself has held that if the trial examiner admitted he was
influenced in his report by matters outside of the record, it will order
a new hearing,188 but it will not order a new hearing because he took
part in the preliminary investigation. 189 The two holdings are in conflict, but the latter reveals the board's lack of concern in maintaining
adequate safeguards of fairness and lays it open to the charge of combining the functions of prosecutor and judge.
If the board does not consider the trial examiner's report but only
the record and there are no improper rulings apparent on the face of
the record, it might be thought that the bias of the trial examiner
was irrelevant.140 It is true that the mere fact of bias alone may not
prejudice the respondent, but if there is a showing of some effect,
either on the face of the record or in the intimidation of witnesses so
as to handicap the obtaining of relevant testimony,m then the proceeding is bad. If there is a clear showing of improper conduct, even
though it does not apparently affect the face of the record, it should
be presumed that such conduct had a prejudicial effect.142 This is
necessary if the respondent is to be assured of a fair hearing because
of the subtle effect that bias might have upon those present at the
hearing. It is also necessary if the board is to gain the respect and confidence of those who come before it.
B. The Attorneys
The board is one of the essential parties to the hearing and is
always represented by its attorney. The regional attorney's function is
not to prosecute the respondent but to make a record which will accurately reflect the facts upon which the board must decide. He is, however, essentially an advocate entrusted with establishing the truth of
the charges contained in the complaint.148 There would seem, therefore, no necessity for the rule that a representative of the charging
union has a right to participate 144 but the respondent cannot object to
this participation.145
The respondent or intervening parties may be represented by
138

Matter of Express Publishing Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 162 (1938).
Matter of Ansley Radio Corp., 18 N. L. R. B. 1028 (1939).
140
Matter of Air Associates, 20 N. L. R. B. 356 (1940).
141
N. L. R. B. v. Air Associates, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 586.
m Inland Steel Co., v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9.
HS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH 13 (1941).
144 Matter of Consumers Power Co., 9 N. L. R. B. 701 (1938).
145
Consumers Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) n3 F. (2d) 38.
189
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counsel, by any other person, or by themselves.1116 The respondent is
entitled to be represented by counsel if he so desires, but if his counsel
is unavailable by his own fault or choice, the trial examiner need not
grant a continuance 147 for there is no necessity that he be so represented. The trial examiner may insist on lawyer-like conduct by the
representatives and may exclude them from the hearing for contemptuous conduct 148 if necessary to preserve the dignity of the hearing.
He may exclude counsel even though such exclusion leaves the respondent wholly unrepresented 149 at the hearing for it may use some
other person as its representative.

C. The Evidence
The primary purpose of the hearing is to develop a record of all
· the facts which the board should consider in making its decision.
Therefore, the most important problems at the hearing stage are those
dealing with the presentation of evidence. There are four main problems-the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to compel documentary evidence and testimony, the admissibility
of evidence, and the right to adduce additional evidence subsequent
to the hearing.
I.

The Right to Present Evidence and Cross-examine Witnesses

Every party to the proceeding is entitled to present evidence and
participate in the cross-examination. However, because of the short
notices required and the liberality i~ allowing amendments to the
complaint, one of the parties may need additional time to gather
evidence and prepare for cross-examination. The trial examiner can
exercise his discretion in granting continuances during the hearing for
this purpose 150 as long as his denial does not cause surprise 151 and there
is adequate preparation of defense and cross-examination.152 The one
requesting the continuance must show that he has a substantial need
and that it will render him a substantial benefit. He must show what
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 25; Matter of Hyman S. Levy, I I N. L. R. B.
964 (1939).
147 N. L. R. B.• v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 98
F. (2d) 488.
148 Ma,tter of Weirton Steel Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 581 (1938).
149 Matter of Baldwin Locomotive Works, 20 N. L. R. B. II oo ( I 940).
150
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 30.
151
Jefferson Electric Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 949.
152 Matter of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 22 N. L. R. B. 580 (1940).
146
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evidence he intends to present, that it is relevant,153 when he will be
able to proceed,m and that he is not at fault for his inability to proceed.155 The trial examiner must use reasonable discretion in ruling
on motions to call additional witnesses, weighing the importance of the
evidence and the delay which it involves.156
The right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses inay be
an empty right if the hearings are held at some place distant from
the scene of the contested conduct because of the larger number of
witnesses which are usually involved.157 This is true even though the
act gives the board power to hold hearings anywhere in the United
States, and even though there is a right to take depositions 158 and
counter depositions 159 in rebuttal of unavailable witnesses, for the
depositions are not as effective evidence as personal testimony. As a
matter of practice the board usually holds a public hearing 160 in the
community in which the unfair practices occurred.101
A party may not claim a denial of the right to present evidence
unless he uses due diligence in trying to present it.162 Claims that the
153

Matter of Leroy C. Phenix, 12 N. L. R. B. 993 (1939).
of Quality Art Novelty Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 817 (1940).
155
Matter of La Paree Undergarment Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 166 (1939) (date
for hearing set at the convenience of the respondent's attorney and then he failed to
appear because he was handling another suit, continuance refused).
m Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)
(respondent asked to call two additional witnesses who were in the room, evidence
offered shown to be highly important and would take only a short time; held an abuse
of discretion to refuse).
157 ln N. L. R. B. v. Prettyman, (C. C. A. 6th 1941) 117 F. (2d) 786, the
hearing was moved from Michigan to Washington, D. C., because the respondent
obtained an injunction from a Michigan court enjoining holding the hearing there.
Though the principle is undoubtedly sound, there is no reason to apply it when the
respondent has made it impossible to hold the hearing at a convenient place. However,
in N. L. R. B. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
883, it was found not prejudicial to hold the hearing at Kansas City instead of Fort
Worth where the respondent had its home offices. Many of the witnesses were nearer
Kansas City and holding the hearing there was more expensive for the respondent but
not shown to be unduly burdensome.
158
Rules & Regulations, art. IL, § 20.
159
Matter of Quality Shirt Mfg. Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 352 (1939).
160
The public can be excluded while testimony is entered to show the employee
had been guilty of a crime for which he has not been convicted. Matter of Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 306 (1940).
161
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH 14 (1941).
162
N. L. R. B. v. Newberry Lumber & Chemical Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 123
F. (2d) 831. Respondent claimed it could not afford an attorney but was represented
by its plant manager. He claimed that he could not call witnesses and did not know
how to cross-examine. None of these claims were justified but were mere dilatory
tactics.
m, Matter

[ Vol. 41

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
•

I

board is hostile to the employer,163 or that presenting evidence would
waive constitutional objections to the act will not justify a refusal to
enter evidence.164 The regional attorney will proceed to present his
evidence in support of the charge and the board will base its decision
on that evidence alone.
The parties should be given all possible opportunity to crossexamine witnesses as to all testimony, whether elicited by the opposing
party or by the trial examiner,165 but the court will not reverse if there
is no showing of injury ,by a restriction of cross-examination.166 When
new parties are added during the hearing, evidence taken prior to their
admission will not be binding on them because they have had no opportunity to cross-examine.167 This difficulty may be overcome by
allowing the new parties to call back prior witnesses and examine them
as to all evidence previously taken.
If proferred evidence is excluded by the trial examiner, offers of
proof should be made. If the exclusion is wrongful, the board will
consider the offers of proof as part of the record in making its decision,168 but if there is no offer of proof, the board may order a new
hearing because of the exclusion of competent and relevant evidence.169
2.

The Right to Com;pel Documentary Evidence and Testimony

If a witness on the stand refuses to answer a proper question, the
trial examiner can order that all the witness's previous testimony be
stricken from the record.110 The witness cannot justify his refusal to
163

N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.

I,

57 S. Ct. 615

(1937).
164

N. L. R. B. v. Anwelt Shoe Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 367 (nor
will the court require a reopening to give the respondent a chance to enter its
evidence).
165
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 103 F. (2d)
147 (undue and prejudicial cross-examination by the trial examiner): Matter of BercutRichards Packing Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 101 (1939) (board sent case back for a new
hearing because the trial examiner refused cross-examination on matter brought out
by his questioning).
166
N. L. R. B. v. Friedrich, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) u6 F. (2d) 888 (denied
cross-examination on irrelevant testimony).
167
Matter of Condenser Corp. of America, 22 N. L. R. B. 347 (1940).
168
Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 306 (1940); Matter
of Armour & Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 682 (1939).
169
Matter of Owens-Illinois Glass Co., II N. L. R. B. 38 (1939). There were
numerous erroneous rulings and no statement as to whether or not offers of proof
were made.
170
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 31.
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testify on the grounds of self-incrimination, for the act grants immunity for all testimony taken during the proceedings.171
Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents may be issued by any member of the board 112 either
at the investigation or the hearing stage of the proceedings.178 The
board has no power to punish for a refusal to obey the subpoena but
must apply to the federal district court for an order requiring compliance with the subpoena. Failure to comply with this court order
constitutes contempt. The district court's function, on application for
such an order, is only to determine the relevancy and materiality of
the evidence sought, and not to inquire into the merits of the controversy.174
The respondent's application for a subpoena must comply with the
rules laid down by the board. The application may be refused for
failure to name the person sought to be subpoened,175 to describe the
documents desired, or to describe the nature of the evidence expected.116 The evidence sought must be relevant,17 7 unavailable by
other means,178 and no more should be asked than is absolutely necessary.179 Subpoenas to obtain confidential information about the charging
union will not be allowed.180 In this are included minutes of meetings,181 membership lists,182 books of account,188 and copies of contracts
171 N. L. R. A., § II (3).
172 Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 21.
173 N. L. R. B. v. Barrett Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 583.
m Cudahy Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 692
( compelled production of payroll so board could hold an election) .
175 North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940)
109 F. (2d) 76.
176 N. L. R. B. v. Acme-Evans Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 477;
N. L. R. B. v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
130; North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940)
109 F. (2d) 76.
177 N. L. R. B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
39; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 641;
Matter of Eagle & Phenix Mills, II N. L. R. B. 361 (1939) (denial of subpoena
upheld where matter to which it was related was later dropped).
118
N. L. R. B. v. Blackstone Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 633
(subpoena of employees to cross-examine as to authenticity of signatures on union
cards where no showing of inability to prove by comparison denied as mere delaying
move).
179 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 450.
180 Matter of Charles Banks Stout, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (1939).
181 Matter of Song Paper Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 657 (1938).
182 Matter of Charles Banks Stout, 15 N. L: R. B. 541 (1939).
188 Matter of Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 5 N. L. R. B. 206 (1938).
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with other companies.184 Subpoenas for this information may be r·efused
not only because it is confidential but also because it is not shown to
be pertinent to the inquiry.185
The mere denial to a respondent of a subpoena will not constitute
reversible error unless there is substantial prejudice. Thus if the
witnesses are obtained without the process,186 or if the board accepts as
true all that the respondent desired to prove 187 by the subpoenaed
evidence, there can be no claim of a denial of fair hearing.
The respondent is not entitled to a subpoena unless he can show
good cause why it should be issued: The regional attorney, on the
other hand, usually has a supply of subpoenas signed in blank and
need not state the reasons why one should be issued. Such inequality
of availability is obviously unfair,188 but it has been held not sufficient
to cause a reversal unless actual prejudice is shown. 189 The placing of
the parties on such different planes in obtaining evidence goes to the
-very heart of a fair hearing and should not be continued. The fact that
the regional attorney may be controlled in his use of subpoenas by his
superiors is not sufficient, for the very essence of a fair hearing is that
both parties shall be governed by the same rules.
This inequality in the issuance of subpoenas by the board is not
corrected by courts in reviewing applications for subpoenas. If the
respondent applies and is refused, he can raise the issue in the circuit
court at the time of the petition for an enforcement order. The test
there will be whether denial constituted a substantial prejudice. On
the other hand, if the regional attorney applies for a subpoena and it
is granted over the objection of the respondent, the issue will be raised
in the district court on the petition for a compliance with the order.
The test here is not whether the subpoena is necessary to the board's
case, but only whether it seeks to obtain evidence that is relevant and
"touching the matter." 190 This results in the court's affirming the
184

Matter of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 14 N: L. R. B. 539 (1939).
Matter of Revere Copper & Brass, 16 N. L. R. B. 437 (1939); Matter of
General Petroleum Corp. of California, 5 N. L. R. B. 982 (1938).
186
N. L. R. B. v. Friedrich, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 888.
187
N. L. R. B. v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 112 F.
(2d) 756.
.
188
Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9.
189
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 641;
North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 76.
190
N. L. R. B. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1940) 36 F.
Supp. 413, partially reversed in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A.
6th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 450.
185
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action of the board in discriminating against the respondent in the
issuance of the subpoena. The remedy for this unfairness lies primarily
with the board in requiring its regional attorney to fulfill the same requirements as the respondent, and if this is not done the court ought
to reverse all cases in which the inequality appears regardless of
whether any prejudice can be proved.

3. What Evidence is Admissible
The act provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law and equity shall not be controlling." 191 This means simply that
much evidence which is not admissible in the courts will be admitted
at the hearing. Any evidence that may be of help to the board in
reaching a decision should be made a part of the record for the board's
consideration.
Irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent evidence may be admitted ·
by the trial examiner but of course the exclusion of it does not constitute error.192 However, the exclusion of relevant and material evidence
is a denial of a fair hearing even though the board's decision might
not have been changed thereby.198 The inevitable result of these holdings is that the board will lean over backwards in admitting extremely
remote evidence in order to avoid being reversed for its exclusion. The
board has consistently allowed evidence of remarks and actions of the
respondent's officers and supervisory employees to show the respondent's attitude toward the charging union.19 "' Evidence of the respondent's acts prior to the passage of the Wagner Act are admissible as
background to show the employer's attitudes and to show motives for
the discharge of employees.195 The whole history of the respondent's
labor policy for the last twenty years may be admitted so that the
191

N. L. R. A., § 10 (b).
Matter of Gates Rubber Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 303 (1938).
198
Donnelly Garment Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 123 F. (2d)
215. But if equivalent error is admitted so that there is no prejudice, there is no
reversible error. Jefferson Electric Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 102 F.
(2d) 949; Matter of Gates Rubber Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 303 (1938). But see
N. L. R. B. v. Cities Service Oil Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 933 (exclusion of relevant hearsay not error where court believes it of only slight evidentiary
value).
194
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 104 F. (2d)
49. The weight of evidence will be considered in the next subdivision.
195
N. L. R. B. v. McLain Fire Brick Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
393; N. L. R. B. v. Eclipse Moulded Products Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
576; C. G. Conn, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390;
N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 458; Matter
of A. S. Abell Co., s N. L. R. B. 644 (1938).
192
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board may have the proper background to interpret its acts since
I935-196 Acts subsequent to the filing of the charge can be proved at
the hearing both to interpret past acts and to ground additional
charges.197 The mere fact of discharge of a union member is evidence
of discrimination if the company fails to show any explanation for the
discharge.198
The greatest departure from the common-law rules of evidence is
in respect to the admission of hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence will
not be excluded if it has any probative value,199 the question of remoteness or credibility because of inability to cross-examine goes only to
the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.200 Where witn~ses testifying as to the genuineness of authorization cards admitted
they had no actual knowledge, they were allowed to testify that they
were told by solicitors that the cards were genuine.201 Hearsay evidence
in written affidavits is also admissible even though here the opportunity
to cross-examine is twice removed. 202 Hearsay in the form of government publications is admissible even though it consists of bulletins by
one of the board's own divisions. 203
Hearsay in a different form is admitted when cases are incorporated, for the whole record of the prior case becomes a part of the
present case.20' Th~ option to incorporate is with the board, the respondent having no right to have the record of a prior case entered
on the record 205 and no right to object if the board orders the consolidation 206 even though he claims he ·would have objected to "the evidence had he known that it might be used for this purpose.201 Evidence
196

Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d; 1942) 129 F. (2d)
922; Matter of Western Union Telegraph Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 34 (1939).
197
Matter of John A. Roebling's Sons Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 482 (1939).
198
N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 863.
199
Union Drawn Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 109 F. (2d)
587. Contra: Matter of Lindeman Power & Equipment Co., II N. L. R. B. 868
(1939). This case, if accurately reported, is definitely out of line with other holdings.
20
°Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206
(1938).
201 N. L. R. B. v. Service Wood Heel q,., (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 470.
202 Cudahy Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) u6 F. (2d) 367.
203 N. L. R. B.
Crowe Coal Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 633.
204 N. L. R. B. v. Hawk & Buck Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 903;
Matter of Hoover Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 902 (1939). These are usually cases of con•
solidating a representation proceeding with a complaint proceeding involving the same
parties.
·
205 Matter of Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L. R. B. I I I (1940).
206 N. L. R. B. v. Niles Fire Brick Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 366.
207 Matter of Armour & Co., 8 N. L. R. B. IIOO (1940).

v.

NLRB

FAIR PROCEDURE

can be admitted to amplify or explain the evidence in the prior case
but it cannot be admitted to contradict.208 It is evident that this liberality in the use of hearsay constitutes a severe limitation on the right to
cross-examine, but such testing of the evtdence at common law was for
the protection of the jury and therefore is not so important in administrative proceedings before critical judges. The board is qualified to
weigh the evidence according to its tested credibility and accuracy and
it is far better to have the doubtful hearsay for what it is worth than
not to have it for consideration at all. However, the board should
not make the hearsay in the consolidated cases available only at its
discretion, but should allow the respondent an equal right to incorporate. It should also allow all parties a full opportunity to amplify,
explain, or rebut the evidence thus incorporated the same as any other
evidence.209
The board has refused to apply fully the common law rules as to
parol evidence 210 and the best evidence. The latter is involved when
the union refuses to show its membership lists or records and is allowed
to prove the number of members it has by oral testimony. 211 This is
consistent with the policy of not requiring the revealing of the union's
records, as was illustrated by the cases of requested subpoenas. There
has not been as much freedom in allowing second best evidence in other
situations,212 and it would seem that the board will require the best
evidence unless it is not readily available. Evidence is not inadmissible
simply because it fails to conform to the allegations in the complaint,
208

Matter of Niles Fire Brick Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 883 (1939).
The parties may stipulate for the incorporation of findings of fact or record
of a prior proceeding, see Matter of Alloy Cast Steel Co., 19 N. L. R. B. 1 (1940),
or that the trial examiner's findings of fact should be the finding of the board, see
Matter of National Battery Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 166 (1940). The board may either
incorporate or merely take judicial notice of the items stipulated. See Matter of Motion
Picture Producers, 15 N. L. R. B. 224 (1939); Matter of Consolidated Paper Co.,
21 N. L. R. B. 125 (1940).
210
Matter of Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., l N. L. R. B. 85 (1935) (allowed
showing that signing of national union membership cards was intended for membership in the local union).
211
Matter of Columbia Broadcasting System, 8 N. L. R. B. 508 (1938) (letters
by employees authorizing the union to represent them not shown because they were
confidential); Matter of Burdick Steel Foundry Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 714 (1938);
Matter of Gate City Cotton Mills, I N. L. R. B. 57 (1935) (membership records not
shown).
212 N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 99 F. (2d)
89. Board refused to enter affidavits of violent acts by the employees because it was
apt to cause more violence. Held, oral claims of such proof need not be admitted.
209
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for the complaint can be amended at the end of the hearing to include
any such evidence that is admitted. 213

4. The Right to Adduce Additional Evidence
After the hearing has been closed, one of the parties may desire
to present other evidence to be used in making the decision. The board
may move to reopen for the presentation of additional testimony 214
or the respondent may move for leave to adduce additional evidence.
The respondent's motion may be made either to the trial examiner
before the filing of the intermediate report, to the board on argument,
- or to the circuit court on P!!tition. The evidence may be taken either
by the trial examiner or by the board and becomes a part of the record
but it cannot be entered before the court in the petition proceedings.215
The case must be remanded to the board for further hearing.
The only reason for the granting of leave to adduce additional
evidence after the close of the hearing is to _permit the bringing before
the board of relevant and material evidence which for some reason
could not be presented at the -hearing.216 The board may refuse to
reopen where there is no showing that the evidence sought to be adduced is relevant 211 and material.218 Even though it is relevant and
material, the respondent must show why it was not adduced at the
hearing. 219 The mere absence of a witness is not sufficient reason if it
was possible for him to be present.220 The failure to enter evidence in
the belief that the board has not established a prima facie case is t;iot
218

M. H. Ritzwoller Co. v. N. L. R. B., {C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II4 F. (2d) 432
( dates of acts proved did not comply with dates set out in the complaint).
214
N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 99 F. {2d) 89.
215
N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) no F. {2d) 780.
216
Matter of Revere Copper & Brass, 16 N. L. R. B. 437 (1939) (exhibits had
been mislaid at the time of the trial and could not be found); Jacobsen v. N. L. R. B.,
{C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 96 (board was arbitrary in refusing right to adduce
evidence on affectation of commerce when it admitted there was insufficient evidence
in the record). The right to reopen may be denied if the evidence sought to be introduced is based on a new theory of defense. Matter of Oil Well Mfg. Co., 14
N. L. R. B. 1n4 '(1939).
217
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 641.
218
N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 94 F. (2d) 138.
219 N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Products Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d)
567; Matter of Revolution Cotton Mills, 9 N. L. R. B. 468 (1938).
220 N. L. R. B. v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 121 F.
(2d) 602 (respondent's officers were in Florida but there was no showing they were
unable to attend or that it would endanger their health; respondent had failed to take
depositions granted); Matter of Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 989
(1940) (vice-president absent).
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sufficient,221 but the belief that the act was unconstitutional has been
held to justify a failure to enter evidence on the merits.222 Even though
the proposed evidence is relevant and unavailable, there is no right
to a reopening to enter it if it is merely cumulative.223
Evidence of facts occurring subsequently to the hearing will not
be permitted where they go only to the change of business conditions,224 change in union membership, 225 or to the respondent's compliance with the order.220 Though such evidence, if admitted, might
necessitate a different decision and order, the constant reopening to
show these fluctuating conditions would make it impossible to, get a
fin.al order.

D. The Record and Intermediate Report
The purpose of the hearing is to provide the board with the necessary information to enable it to arrive at a just decision. There are
two main sources of this information, the record and the intermediate
report. The act provides that a written record shall be made in all
complaint cases 227 containing all of the pleadings, a transcript of all
testimony, copies of all exhibits, incorporated records of other proceedings, all offers of proof, and rulings on motions.228 Arguments on
motions during the hearing and oral argument at the end of the hearing may be included on the discretion of the trial examiner, but their
exclusion will not constitute prejudice.220 The trial examiner is not
221

N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Products Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 120 F.
(2d) 567.
222
Matter of Fashion Piece Dye Works, 6 N. L. R. B. 274 (1938). This is the
decision on the case after the court had ordered a reopening. The court decision could
not be found. Contra: N. L. R. B. v. Anwelt Shoe Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1937)
93 F. (2d) 367. This question is now moot because there is no question as to the constitutionality of the act.
228
See New Idea, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) II7 F. (2d) 517
at 525; N. L. R. B. v. J. S. Popper, Inc., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 602
at 604.
224
N. L. R. B. v. Swift & Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 222;
N. L. R. B. v. Condenser Corp., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 67; Matter of
Viking Pump Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 576 (1939).
225
N. L. R. B. v. B_iles-Coleman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 96 F. (2d)
197. Contra: N. L. R. B. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 129
F. (2d) 661.
226
N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co. (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) 96 F. (2d) 193;
N. L. R. B. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 1004;
Matter of Lone Star Bag Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 244 (1938).
227 N. L. R. A., § 10 (c).
228
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 32, as amended 6 FED. REG. 4603 (1941).
229
Id., § 29; N. L. R. B. v. Condenser Corp., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F.
(2d) 67.
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allowed to take "off the record" statements 280 and exclusion from the
record of questioning and discussion makes the record incomplete and
invalidates the proceedings.":rni The respondent has a right to have his
own reporter present to record the whole proceedings even though
the official reporter records all of the testimony. The exclusion of the
respondent's reporter is a denial of a substantial right even though no
injury is shown.232 •
The intermediate report is primarily the trial examiner's summation and interpretation of the record based on his observations at the
hearing and containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations
as to the disposition of the case.288 It may include his reasons for rulings
on motions, his method of weighing the evidence, and his belief as to
the credibility of the witnesses. The report is only a recommendation
to the board and is in no way binding.234 The board may ignore or
discard it.235 However, the board may accept the findings in the report
as final if the parties file no exceptions '286 according to the rules. 287
An intermediate report need not be made, but the case may be
transferred directly from the trial examiner to the board for it to make
the proposed findings of fact. 288 This practice is followed only in the
exceptional cases.
The intermediate report _is not only filed with the board but is
served on the parties and gives them notice of the probable nature of
the order so that they may file exceptions and have oral argument on
these issues before the board. If no intermediate report is made, the
board will serve its proposed findings of fact on the parties. After the
Second Morgan Case, 289 there was the question whether the absence of
the proposed findings constituted a denial of a fair hearing. The board
280
Matter of Inland Steel Co., ·9 N. L. R. B. 783 (1938). The n~ture .of the ,
excluded portion is not clear, but the board ordered it incorporated into the records.
281
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 103 F. (2d)
147 (exclusion of testimony taken and arguments on its admissibility).
232
Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 9.
233
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 32, as amended 6 FED. REG. 4603 (1941).
m N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 671.
285
N. L. R. B. v. Air Associates, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 586.
286
,
Matter of Bishop & Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 207 (1939). A party not involved in
the hearing may file exceptions if they may be affected by the proposed findings.
Matter of Ward Baking Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 558 (1938).
287
Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 33, as amended 6 FED. REG. 4603 (1941).
288
Id., § 36 (a); Matter of Killefer Mfg. Co., 22 -N. L. R. B. 484 (1940).
289
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938) (holding
invalid an order of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act
based upon a proceeding in which no sp·ecific c.omplaint or any proposed findings had
been served on the parties).
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immediately sought to withdraw several of its cases which were before
the circuit courts in order to supply the proposed :findings which it had
omitted. The power of the circuit court to remand and the board to
correct was upheld.240 This question, however, became moot by the
decisions that the board's cases were not governed by the Second
Morgan Case because the only purpose of the proposed :findings was
to give the parties notice of the issues in the case and this need was
supplied in the board's procedure by the issuance of a complaint
which specifically stated the charges relied on by the board. Therefore,
an intermediate report of proposed :findings was not necessary where
the parties filed briefs and had oral argument before the board.241
There need not be any filing of briefs or any oral arguments where
the parties do not request it.242 It naturally follows from these decisions
that the board can disregard or completely discard the intermediate
report without denying a fair hearing. 248
The soundness of these conclusions must be considered in the light
of the rules governing the necessity for specific allegations in the complaint. The extreme liberality of those rules may seem to make the
above result unsound, but the test should not be on the abstractions of
the rules but whether, in a particular case, there was any surprise due
to a lack of knowledge of the issues. The detail of the particular
complaint, the time elapsing during the hearing, the nature of the
evidence presented, and, the opportunity for oral argument should all
be considered together to determine whether there has been any actual
prejudicial surprise. If there is any question about there being surprise,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of the respondent so as to assure
him of a fair hearing.

III
THE DECISION AND ORDER

Upon the filing of the intermediate report or the proposed :findings
and the serving of copies on the parties, any party may :file exceptions
240
Ford Motor Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 364, 59 S. Ct. 301 (1938);
N. L. R. B. v. Lane Cotton Mills, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 568; Inland
Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 246.
241
N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904
(1938); N. L. R. B. v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 98 F.
(2d) 16.
'
242
N. L. R. B. v. Hearst, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 658; N. L. R. B. v.
American Potash & Chemical Corp., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 98 F. (2d) 488.
243
N. L. R. B. v. Air Associates, (C. C. A. 2d, 194-1) 121 F. (2d) 586.
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and request oral argument. 244 A failure to make a request waives all
exceptions and right to argument and permits the board to adopt the
findings of the trial examiner. The function of the exceptions is to
limit the matters which the board must review, and the function of
the argument is to point out why certain rulings or findings constitute
error. It is then the responsibility of the board to weigh all of the factors on the disputed points, make findings of fact, and issue an order.245

A. The Right That the Decision Be Made by the Board
It is evident from the mass of work which the board must handle
that the board members cannot possibly read the whole record of the
cases that come before it. 246 Therefore, it has a review section whose
duty is to analyze and summarize the record, the intermediate report,
and all arguments before the board and to present this to the board
without making any formal recommendations. The board may consult
the review attorney to get further information which it may need in
making its decision. After oral argument the board will state the
nature of the result desired to the review attorney and have him draw
up findings of fact and an order in compliance with those desires.
These, when approved, become the final decision of the board.
This procedure has caused severe criticism on the ground that the
decision is not made by the board but by subordinates. As long as the
review attorney acts only as a clerk or an assistant, there is no harm,
but respondents are constantly fearful that the record will not be fairly
summarized and that the board members will not exercise their independent judgment but rely on informal recommendations of the review
attorney. Therefore some respondents have alleged a failure of the
board to give adequate consideration and have asked the circuit court
for interrogatories to the board to determine the method by which it
has arrived at its decision.
In only one case have the requested interrogatories been granted
to determine whether the board has substantially mastered the record
before adopting a report. 247 The cases refusing interrogatories have

-

Rules & Regulations, art. II, § 37, as amended 6 FED. REG. 4604 (1941).
245
Though it is not necessary that all of the board members attend die oral argument, the board will order further argument where one of its members has been
replaced after argument and before issuing the order. Matter of Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 22 N. L. R. B. 580 (1940).
246
As of January 1, 1940, there were awaiting decision 306 cases with a total
record of 600,000 pages. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE MONOGRAPH 25, note 107
(1941).
247
N. L. R. B. v. Cherry Cotton Mills (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 444.
244
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gone on two separate theories. One group has held that the court could
not and would not examine into the mental processes of the board; that
the board, like a court or jury, was immune to such questioning because it would put a fear in the members of being revealed by their
colleagues. In addition, the granting of such interrogatories would
harrass the board to such an extent that would make it impossible for
it to handle the cases presented.248 These cases give the board unlimited
power to use subordinates.
The larger group of cases have refused interrogatories on the
ground that the respondent's allegations were insufficient to justify
the court's using its power to issue interrogatories. An allegation of
failure by the board to read "all of the record" is certainly insu:fficient.249 The exceptions to the Intermediate Report need not be considered, and the briefs are presumed to have been read. 251> The court
will inquire into the method used only when there is no showing from
the record that the order which purports to come from the board does
in fact come from it.251 The receipt of briefs and hearing of oral argument by the board is sufficient and the court will presume the regularity
of the proceedings.252
There is little difference in the net result of the two theories, for
the second limits the cases in which interrogatories may be granted to
those cases in which there is not full oral argument and no showing
of any consideration of the record or the Intermediate Report.258
It is necessary for effective administration that the board should be
allowed a liberal use of its review section to expedite the speedy handling of cases, even to the extent of permitting the review attorney
to attend the oral argument. However, the board should not abdicate
its judicial function by a delegation to subordinates. If the first theory
is followed, there is nothing to prevent this abdication. Certainly the
248 N. L. R. B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
39; Bethlehem Steel Co. v N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 641; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) n4 F. (2d) 930;
N. L. R. B. v. Botany Worsted Mills, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 263.
249 N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) n8 F. (2d) 766;
N. L. R. B. v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 18.
25 ° Cupples Co., Mfrs. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 953.
251
N. L. R. B. v. Lane Cotton Mills, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 568.
252 Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 246.
258
N. L. R. B. v. Cherry Cotton Mills, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 444.
Interrogatories were granted where there was no oral argument by the complainant.
However, this case was in effect overruled by N. L. R. B. v. Lane Cotton Mills,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 568, where there was no oral argument in support
of the proposed finding and interrogatories were refused.

[Vol. 41

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

court should gverthrow a decision reached by a method not in compliance with the statute. Is there any reason why it should refuse to
aid the injured party in obtaining the evidence of such violation where
there is good reason to believe it exists? The objection of harassment
by such inquiries can be avoided by a strict requirement of substantial
showing of a reason to believe that the proceeding was unfair. However, the rule that administrative tribunals should have the same immunity as the courts is now undoubtedly the law in the federal courts
and no interrogatories will be granted to determine how they arrived
at their decision.254
If there is no method of determining whether the board or its subordinates made the decision, there is no way of guaranteeing that the
decision was made by an unbiased tribunal. It is essential that the body
making the final decision -be without bias, especially since there is no
guarantee of an unbiased trial examiner. The board, through its separate divisions, acts as prosecutor, judge, and jury. These functions are
kept separate as much as possible; so the belief of the regional attorney
that the respondent is guilty when the complaint is served does not
constitute prejudgment by the board in its judi~ial capacity.255 Where
a member of the board has participated in a case prior to becoming
a member, there is such predetermination as to disqualify him from
sitting on the case. If he does participate and the decision is unanimous,
the proceeding is still unfair, for there is no way of knowing how much
his position influenced the other members. 256

B. The Findings of Fact
Before the board can issue a cease and desist order, it is required
by the act to make findings of fact on which that order is based. The
'
254

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999 (1941), noted 30
J. 155 (1941).
255
Press Co. v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 937 at 940. The
board attorney at hearing said, "The Board's position is that both companies have
violated the act." bn, oral argument, the company attorney was asked if he really
believed this was prejudice and when he refused to answer a board member sa~d,
"'You know that is sheer demagoguery for the benefit of the small audience to your
rear." When the attorney asked how much time he had left, he was told, "You
have four minutes if you think it will do you any good." Held this did not show;
prejudgment.
256
Berkshire Employees Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
235. Edwin Smith, board member, prior to the case had urged a boycott in favor of
the union. The case was then remanded to the board to see if one of its members
were biased. The court should have ordered a reargument before the two unbiased
members.
ILL.

B.
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findings need not set forth any abstract or summary of the record but
only the ultimate facts on which the order is based.257 The purpose of
the findings is not to determine whether the order is supported by the
evidence but only to enable the respondent to determine the bases on
which the board justifies its order. The findings need not, therefore,
set out conflicts in the evidence, or facts which are contrary or immaterial to the decision, but only the primary evidentiary facts relied
on.258 The findings should not include statements of witnesses, expressions of opinion, or reasoning by which the board arrived at its
findings, but merely a "clear-cut statement of the ultimate facts." 259
The distinction between ultimate facts and mere evidence is very
intangible in its application, but the court will not reverse for faulty
findings of fact provided they state the basic facts and are sufficiently
definite to inform the respondent of the facts relied on.260 The mere
allegation of defective findings without specification of particular
instances is insufficient. The court will not search the record for undesignated error.261
The findings of fact must comply with the pleadings. There is no
right to make findings on issues not tried at the hearing. Formal compliance with the complaint is not necessary if the findings are in accord
with the issues actually litigated at the hearing. 262 The findings must
also comply with the order, stating all of the facts necessary for the
issuing of the order. If the findings of fact stated make a clear inference of the violation of the act, they need not state specifically 268
m N. L. R. B. v. Swift & Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 143.
N. L. R. B. v. Texas Mining & Smelting Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 117 F.

258

(2d) 86.
259
N. L. R. B._ v. Thompson Products, (C. C. A. 6th, 1938} 97 F. (2d) 13.
200
N. R. L.B. v. Bradley Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 768;
Swift & Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 87. The findings
need not be stated formally. The inclusion of evidence and reasoning does not necessarily make them bad enough to constitute reversible error.
261
North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940)
109 F. (2d) 76 (petitioner alleged "The so-called findings •.. are admixture of
recitation of evidence, argument • . . and conclusions of fact not based upon evidence").
262
N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904
( I 93 8}. Amended complaint alleged discriminatory refusal to rehire employees who
had struck. Findings stated discriminatory discharge. Held, the distinction is based
upon whether there was a "labor dispute" under the act, which was too technical. The
respondent knew that the issue was discrimination and litigated it.
268
N. L. R. B. v. National Motor Bearing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 652. No specific finding of discriminatory refusal to reinstate but a clear inference from evidence stated in the findings that this was true. No need to state
employees unable to obtain substantial equivalent employment as it will be implied.
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that the act has been violated, but if the facts which constitute a violation are in dispute, the findings must resolve the conflict in the evidence
before an order can be issued regarding that violation. 264
C. The Basis of the Findings

The board is entitled to make findings of fact based only on
evidence in the record. The act provides that on appeal to the circuit
court, "The findings of the board as to the facts, if supported by evi..:
dence, shall be conclus1ve.n2 65 This is a limitation on the court's power
to review the action of the board, but still leaves the parties a barrier
of protection against arbitrary decisions by the board.
The findings of fact upon which the board's order is based are for
the board and not the ,courts to determine. Whether there has been
a bargaining in good faith, 266 what is a proper bargaining unit,267
whether there has been any change in union membership,268 what
constitutes equivalent employment,269 and what constitutes a labor
dispute,210-all of these are questions of fact for the board to determine just as much as questions of interference, domination, discrimination,211 or refusal to bargain. These findings of fact must be
"supported by evidence" which is construed to mean supported by
"substantial evidence." 272
264 N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 59 S. Ct. 490
(1939) (blanket order to reinstate all strikers. Respondent contended it had cause
to refuse as to some because of refusal to work or inefficiency. No finding as to whether
there was such just cause.
265 N. L. R. A., § IO (e).
266 N. L. R. B. v. Martin Bros. Box Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 130 F. (2d)
202; Singer Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 131; JefferyDeWitt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) 9-1 F. (2d) 134.
267 N. L. R. B. v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F.
(2d) 130; Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 698.
268 N. L. R. B. v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 109
F. (2d) 552.
269 Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 110 F.
(2d) 179.
270 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. .zd, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 202.
But see C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 390.
271 Where discharge is because of violation of the respondent's rules, the question
of the reasonableness of the rule is one of law for the court to determine. Midland Steel
Products Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 800.
272 See Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. N. L. R. B., 301 U.S. 142 at 147,
57 S. Ct. 648 (1937).
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What Is Substantial Evidence?

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." 273 This is the classic definition that is frequently
quoted, but this definition does not give a clear test. The court cannot
overrule the decision of the board simply because it would have arrived
at an opposite result 274 but can overrule only if it feels there is no
reasonable ground for the board's decision. 275
The courts have, in search of a test, tried to draw an analogy between the board's hearings and jury trials. The courts have not been
clear whether the test of what is substantial evidence is that which
would justify the judge in refusing to direct a verdict for the respondent276 (defendant), or that which would justify a judge in
refusing to set aside a verdict for the board 277 (plaintiff). An entirely
different measure is used in these two situations in common-law trials.
If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to make out a case, the
verdict cannot be directed against him regardless of how much contradicting evidence is presented by the defendant. The judge does not
weigh the evidence, but considers only the plaintiff's case. However,
if the jury finds for the plaintiff, the judge may then weigh both
sides of the evidence and if he finds that a reasonable man would not
have found for the plaintiff, he can set aside the verdict and order a
278 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197 at 229, 59 S.
Ct. 206 (1938).
274 N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 206 at 226, 60 S. Ct.
493 (1940).
275 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) u7 F. (2d) 868;
N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 153. Dissent
by one member of the board does not lessen the weight that must be given to the
findings. Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 922.
276 Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) 127 F. (2d)
109; N. L. R. B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.
Ct. 501 (1939); Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) u4 F. (2d) 6u; N. L. R. B. v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 128; N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., (C. C. A.
4th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 818.
277 N. L. R. B. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 129 F.
(2d) 661; Southern Assn. of Bell Telephone Employees v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A.
5th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 410; Stonewall Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th,
1942) 129 F. (2d) 629; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A.
8th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 680; N. L. R. B. v. Bell Oil & Gas. Co., (C. C. A. 5th,
1938) 98 F. (2d) 406; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 10th,
1940) II5 F. (2d) 1007.
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new trial. The courts have talked about both of these tests, but have
not been fully aware of the distinction between them. 278
'The real distinction between the two tests is whether the court
upholds the board by considering only the board's evidence and ignoring the respondent's evidence or whether it reverses the board upon
consideration of all of the evidence of both sides. It is clear that the
Supreme Court has adopted the principle of examining only the board's
evidence, and if that is substantial, the board's findings will be upheld
regardless of the strength of the respondent's evidence.279
The circuit courts have not consistently followed this test, but in
a majority of cases have reviewed the whole record to consider both the board's and the respondent's evidence.280 Some circuit courts, in
278

Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) u2 F. (2d)
545; N. L. R. B. v. Asheville Hosiery ,Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 288.
In both cases the court used the two terms almost interchangeably.
270
N. L. R. B.·v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.
Ct. 501 (1939) {enunciated directed verdict test); N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 60 S. Ct. 493 (1940) {recited only evidence of the board);
N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S. CT. 918 (1940) (seems
to cpnsider only the board's evidence); N. L. R. B. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Corp., 315 U. S, 282, 62 S. Ct. 608 (H}42) (per curiam opinion refused
to consider clear evidence of discharge for insubordination:); N. L. R. B. v. Nevada
Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 62 S. Ct. 960 (1940) (per curiam opinion
looked only at board's evidence).
2 0
- ~ Some of those reversing upon consideration of the whole record: Dannen
Grain & Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 321;
N. L. R.. B. v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 260;
N. L. R. B. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 661;
Stonewall Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 629;
N. L. R. B. v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 201;
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 109; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 680;
N. L. R. B. v. Sheboygan Chair Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 436;
N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 353;
Wilson & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 913; N. L. R. B. v.
International Shoe Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) n6 F. (2d) 31; N.L.R.B. v. Asheville Hosiery Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 288; N. L. R. B. v. Union
Pacific Stages, (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 153; N. L. R. B. v. Thompson
Products, (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 13.
· Some- of those sustaining the board upon consideration of the whole record:
N. L. R. B. v. Precision Castings Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 639;
N. L. R. B. v. Bank of America, (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 624; Sperry
Gyroscope Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 922; N. L. R. B. v.
Empire Worsted Mills, (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 668; Gamble-Robinson Co.
v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 588; N. L. R. B. v. Condenser
Corp., (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 67; N. L. R. B. v. Mason Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 810; Owens Illinois Glass Co. v. N.L.R:B.,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 670; N. L. R. B. v. Texas Mining & Smelting Co.,
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applying the Supreme Court's test, have clearly expressed their own
disapproval of it.281
There seems to be little reason for bringing in an analogy to the
review of jury trials. The rules developed for a hearing before laymen 282 are unsuitable for administrative hearings. The question for
the court is simply whether the board's decision is one which might
have been arrived at by a reasonable prudent man. If the court examines one side of the evidence and does not consider the conflicting
evidence, there is no guarantee of a reasonable result. The board may
be able to prove a prima facie case only to have the respondent completely destroy it by contradicting evidence. The court can determine
the reasonableness of the result and protect the parties from arbitrary
decisions only by a consideration of the whole record. If there be any
merit in the jury analogy, the board is the jury and the decision its
verdict, and the test is whether it should be set aside.
This is not an argument for a more rigid review of the facts, for
the court should have some faith in the board's inherent fairness.
(C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 86; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940) IIS F. (2d) 1007; N. L. R. B. v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 667.
Some of those sustaining on the board's evidence alone: N. L. R. B. v. Swift &
Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 222; Canyon Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A.
8th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 953; N. L. R. B. v. Bersted Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1942)
128 F. (2d) 738; N. L. R. B. v. Bradley Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 128 F.
(2d) 768; N. L. R. B. v. Hudson Motor Car Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) 128 F. (2d)
528; N. L. R. B. v. Quality Art Novelty Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 903;
N. L. R. B. v. Eclipse Moulded Products Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
576; N. L. R. B. v. Alladin Industries, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 377;
N.L.R.B. v. Elkland Leather Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1942) 114 F. (2d) 221;
N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) 95 F. (2d) 818.
_ Some of those reversing on the board's evidence alone: N. L. R. B. v~ TimesPicayune Publishing Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 257; United Biscuit
Co. v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 771; N.L.R.B. v. Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 128; N. L. R. B. v.
A. S. Abell, (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) 97 F. (2d) 951.
It is obvious that cases in the second and fourth group are at best only dicta for
either test.
281 ''We have recognized ( or tried to) that findings must be sustained, even
when they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and we have ignored,
or at least have endeavored to ignore, tlie shocking injustices which such findings,
opposed to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, produce." Wilson & Co. v.
N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) n4 at n7.
282 The verdict cannot be directed if the plaintiff has presented substantial
evidence, for that would deny jury trial. However, the verdict can be set aside when
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, for this does not deny jury trial but
requires a new jury trial. These principles have no relevance to the procedure before
the board,
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The court should not reverse unless the board's decision is clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary. The Supreme Court rule is based on an
unexpressed desire to protect administrative tribunals from overzealous
_and distrustful courts, but in trying to do this the court has itself
adopted an arbitrary rule instead of meeting the issue squarely.
In many cases the court has found the board's decision unsupported
on the ground that the burden of proof was on the board and that it
had not met that burden.283 In other cases the court has held that once
the board has established its case, the burden of proof was on the
respondent to explain or disprove the charges 284 and that on a petition
for enforcement, the respondent has the burden of proving that the
findings are not supported by the evidence.285 All of this language is
merely a rationalization to give an appearance of objectivity to a decision at which the court has arrived. If the court looks only to one
side of the evidence, the burden of proof is irrelevant, for there is
only the burden on the board of going forward with the evidence
until it has made out a case. If the court looks at both sides of the
evidence, the burden of proof is equally irrelevant for the sole question then is whether, on all of the evidence, the result is reasonable.
The resort to language of burden of proof is only an attempt by the
court to hide its desire to require a greater amount of evidence.

D. The Weighing of E'Oidence
Although the tests as to what is substantial evidence are indefinite
and are primarily based on the court's personal attitude toward administrative bodies, there are some general principles used in a court's
weighing of the evidence. The common-law rules for the admission
of evidence do not apply, but the rules of deductions from that
evidene'e should still apply 286 in so far as they are based upon the rules
of reasoning rather than upon common-law tradition.
I.

Conflicting E'Oidence

Regardless of which test of substantial evidence is used, if the
283
N. L. R. B. v. Riverside Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 302;
Martel Mills Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 624; Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 545; N. L. R. B. v.
Express Publishing Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1940) I I I F. (2d) 588.
284
N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 167;
N. L. R. B. v. Viking Pump Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 759.
285
N. L. R. B. v. Brown Paper Mill Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 867.
286
N. L. R. B. v. Illinois Tool Works, (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) II9 F. (2d) 356;
N. L. R. B. v. Lion Shoe Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 448.
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evidence is conflicting and equivocal, the board should be upheld. 287
The interpretation of the facts is for the board and not the court~288
When the evidence is conflicting the board is entitled to resolve every
reasonable doubt against the respondent and in favor of the allegations
on the complaint.289 If the second test 290 is used, the board can act on
inconsistent and disputed testimony,291 for mere contradiction will not
justify reversal. However, the court should see to what extent conflicting evidence explains or qualifies the board's evidence and inferences and determine whether the board has remained within the bounds
of reasonableness in resolving the conflicts.292
In a number of cases the courts have held that the findings were
not supported because, they say, the evidence was equally consistent
with two contrary hypotheses, therefore it supports neither.298 If this
statement is made in reference to a single piece of evidence, it is correct,
for if a fact is equally consistent with two contrary hypotheses, then
by common rules of reasoning it can infer neither and no reasonable
man would act in reliance on either without more evidence.29" However, in all of these cases the statement was made in reference to evidence of a whole course of conduct, some of which tended to support
and some of which tended to deny the findings of the board. To expand
the rule to hold that when the whole evidence supports either of two
287
N.L.R.B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 713;'
N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 458;
Aqwilines v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) 87 F. (2d) 146.
288
N.L.R.B. v. Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 358 (1941).
289
N. L. R. B. v. Keystone Freight Lines, (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
414; Reliance Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 311;
Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 180;
N. L. R. B. v. Chattanooga Bakery, (C. C. A. 6th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 201;
N. L. R. B. v. Walworth Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 816.
290
The test of whether the evidence of the board alone is substantial will be
termed the first test and the test of whether the evidence of the whole record shows
a reasonable ground for the finding will be termed the second test.
291
N. L. R. B. v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113
F. (2d) 667.
292
Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp. v~ N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 114
F. (2d) 61 I. If the board had unlimited powers df resolving the conflicts, judicial
review would be no protection against arbitrary findings.
298
Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 10th, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 587; Bussman Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 111 F.
(2d) 783; Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 100.
m Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 46 S. Ct. 564 (1926).
This is the principal case relied on and is restricted to inferences from a single piece
of evidence. In a logical sense such evidence is irrelevant.
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equally justifiable but inconsistent inferences it supports neither 295 .is
dangerously unsound, for it removes from the board all power to
choose which inference to believe. It leads to the conclusion that the
findings will be supported only if there is a single justifiable inference.
This is contrary to the intent of the act and the great weight of
authority.
2. Credibility of Witnesses
The court will not pass on the credibility of witnesses but will
accept the board's conclusion on whether a witness can be believed.296
As a matter of fact, the boarq. has no more opportunity to observe the
witnesses than the court, so there is no reason why the board's finding
should be conclusive. The trial examiner is the only one who can
observe, and it is his findings as to credibility that should be conclusive on both the board and the court. Under the present plan,
however, his findings are only recommendations and are not binding
on the board.
When the evidence is disputed, the board is entitled to resolve all
reasonable-doubts as to credibility of witnesses in favor of those supporting the charge,201 but the board cannot disregard the testimony of
the respondent's witnesses unless they a~e impeached or contradicted.298
This rule, preventing the board from discrediting a witness, should not
be applied when the board's discrediting is based on the personal observation of the witness by the trial examiner.
'

3. Hearsay and Incompetent Evidence
Hearsay evidence can be admitted and may be considered for its
probative value,299 but hearsay alone will not support a finding. 300 If
it is corroborated by other relevant evidence which alone might not be
2911
See Texarkana Bus Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 119 F. (2d)
480 at 486.
296
N. L. R. B. v. Wallace Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 818.
297
N. L. R. B. v. Armour & Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 316;
N. L. R. B. v. Burry Biscuit Corp., (C.,C. A. 7th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 540.
298
American Smelting & R~fining Co. v. N. L. R. B., {C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 126
F. (2d) 680; N. L. R. B. v. Sheboygan Chair Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d)
436; N. L. R. B. v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 122 F. (2d)
433; Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. N. L. ~- B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 100;
N. L. R. B. v. Empire Furniture Corp., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 92.
299
Union Drawn Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 587.
soo N. L. R. B. v. Bell Oil & Gas, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 406. See
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U.S. 197 at 230, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938);
Tyne v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 832.
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enough, the finding will be supported. 301 On the same reasoning,
affidavits alone will not support a finding as there is no opportunity to
cross-examine or test the honesty of the witness. 302
The same principle applies to incompetent evidence. It is admissible,sos carries weight, but will not support a finding unless corroborated by other evidence.804
The rule that hearsay or incompetent evidence cannot support a
finding is contrary to the principle that the finding will be upheld if it
is reasonable from the evidence. A large amount of hearsay may make
an inference much more reasonable than some circumstantial evidence.
The sole test should be whether the inference is reasonable regardless
of the technical nature of the evidence relied upon,805 but the courts
have not fully escaped from their common-law concepts and demand
some bit of "legal evidence" to corroborate the hearsay or incompetent
evidence.

4. Circumstantial and Background Evidence
There is no question but that circumstantial evidence is admissible
and will be sufficient to support a finding. 306 The board may even consider as evidence the failure of the respondent to call a witness who is
available and who would be able to refute the charges if they were
refutable.807 In absence of direct evidence, the board may rely on circumstantial evidence even though it is contradicted by the respondent's
direct evidence.808 This is undoubtedly true under the Supreme Court's
test of substantial evidence, but should be qualified by the rule of
reasonableness under the second test.
The board may consider the history of the situation as a background
in which to view the facts involved in the acts complained of as well
as the facts themselves. Background evidence alone will not support
N. L. R. B. v. Service Wood Heel Co., (C. C. A: 1st, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 470.
N. L. R. B. v. Rath Packing Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 684.
sos N. L. R. B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 713.
304
N. L. R. B. v. Bell Oil & Gas, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 870.
305
See. Martel Mills Corp. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) n4 F. (2d)
624 at 630. Hearsay may be sufficient if direct evidence is not available and the hearsay is not denied by direct evidence, for 1t is the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.
306 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
658; N. L. R. B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 532;
Hartsell Mills Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 291.
307
N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642 (1937).
308 Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 757•
soi

302
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a finding,3° 9 but the failure to consider it may lead the court to hold
.that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence under the
second test.810

5. Statements by Supervisory Employees
In practically all cases, the respondent is a large business concern.
The act constituting domination, interference, or coercion of employees
can be found only in the acts of its agents. The difficult problem is the
extent of aµthority which must be vested in the employee before his
unauthorized acts
be binding on the respondent. The board has
designated an employee who has this necessary authority as a "supervisory" employee.
The test of who is a supervisory employee is not the same as in
cases of respondeat superior, for here he need have no actual authority
to commit the acts constituting the violation.311 If he has power to hire
and fire, 812 or the power to recommend dismissal,818 certainly the respondent is bound by his antiunion conduct, because that conduct is
bound to create a sense of fear in the workers whom he controls. How
ever, the control over dismissal is not the sole determining factor. 814
It is sufficient that the workers reasonably believe he expresses the
wishes of the respondent or was acting in the respondent's behalf 815
and were thereby restrained or coerced. Casual statements in private
conversation are usually not enough,816 for such statements will not be
considered by the workers as expressions of the company.

will

809

N. L. R. B. v. Union Pacific Stages (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 153.
Newport News Shipping & Dry Dock Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th,
1939) IOI F. (2d) 841.
811
International Assn. of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 311 U.S. 72, 61 S. Ct. 83
(1940); N. L. R. B. v. Moench Tanning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d)
951; N. L. R. B. v. Swank Products, (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 108 F. (2d) 872. Contra:
Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 100.
812
N. L. R. B. v. Planters Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 750;
N. L. R. B. v. A. S. Abell Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) 97 F. (2d) 951.
813
New Idea, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 517; N.
L. R. B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 753; Virginia
Ferry Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 103.
814
N. L. R. B. v. Continental Oil Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 120;
Matter of All-Steel Products Mfg. Co., 16 N. L. R. B. 72 (1939). Contra: Ballston. Stillwater Knitting Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1-938) 98 F. (2d) 758.
815
N. L. R. B. v. Cities Service Oil Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 933;
International Assn. of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 3 I I U. S. 72, 61 S. Ct. 83 ( 1940);
N. L. R. B. v. Moench Tanning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 951; N. L.
R. B. v.. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) n8 F. (2d) 780.
316
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 119 F.
(2d) 631; N. L. R. B. v. Whittier Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 111 F. (2d) 474.
810
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Conduct of supervisory employees apparently amounting to coercion will not support a finding if it is shown that it did not in fact
result in any restraint on the workers' exercise of their rights,817 or if
it is substantially outweighed by contradicting evidence,818 or if the
respondent informs the workers that such statements do not represent
the will of the employer. 819

6. The Trial Examiner's Report
The findings in the trial examiner's report are only recommendations to the board. It may uphold, or reverse those findings in whole
or in part.820 The board will give weight to the trial examiner's
recommendations, for he has first-hand knowledge of the hearing and
can observe the witnesses.821 These recommendations are not binding
on the board,822 but if the board overrules them, the court will give
them weight in considering whether the board's findings are supported
by evidence.828
Of all of the individuals involved in the procedure, the trial
examiner is in the best position to arrive at the proper decision. He has
first-hand knowledge of all that is in the record, hears the arguments
on all motions, and observes the witnesses. The board members seldom
read the record, need not read the briefs, and need not all attend the
oral argument. They rely largely on the summary of the record ( excluding most of the oral argument) made by members of the review
section. The court can properly place greater reliance and responsibility on the conclusions of the original hearing officer. The Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure recommends that
the trial examiner be given power to render a final order subject to
review by the board.
811

Wilson & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 913.
N. L. R. B. v. Sparks Withington Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 78.
This limitation would not apply under the .firsf test of substantial evidence.
819
N. L. R. B. v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d)
353; H.J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 3n U.S. 514, 61 S. Ct. 320 (1941), affirming (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) IIO F. (2d) 843 (denial can be made through the foremen
or by posting notices on the bulletin board).
820
Matter of Semet-Solvay Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 511 (1938).
821
Matter of Fashion Piece Dye Works, 6 N. L. R. B. 274 (1938).
822
N. L. R. B. v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 122 F.
(2d) 433; Burk Bros, v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 686.
823
Wilson & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 411 (board's
.findings upheld in spite of trial examiner's .findings to the contrary); A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) n7 F. (2d) 868 (board's .findings
reversed partly because contrary to the trial examiner's .findings).
818
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7. Other E'Vidence
The board has the same powers to take judicial notice of facts outside of the i;ecord as a court.324 The board should have no more power
than a court,. for it should preserve the right of a party to refute the
evidence used against him. Offers of proof made at the hearing when
· evidence is wrongfully excluded will be considered by the board and
weighed the same as if it had been admitted.325
If the board relies on only part of the evidence which supports its
findings and that part is not substantial, then the finding will be reversed even though the whole evidence which the board could have
relied on would have supported the findings. 326 There is little justifi.:.
cation for holding that such an error justifies reversal, but it will have
the salutary effect of compelling the board to be more accurate and
more explicit in stating the full basis upon which the findings have
been made.
E. The Order
The act provides that the board can issue and serve on any person
named in the complaint an order requiring such person to cease and
desist the unfair labor practices found or to take such affirmative action
as will effectuate the policies of the act. 327 The board has the power
to decide how prior unfair practices can best be expunged and the court
will not modify the order if it is reasonable. 328
The order can compel the reinstatement of discriminatorily discharged employees with back pay,329 can compel the respondent to
824
N. L. R. B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 713
(notice that failure to bargain ,collectively has been one of the most prolific causes of
labor disturbances); Jefferson Electric Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939);
102 F. (2d) 949 (notice of the cleavage in the labor movement).
825
Matter of Van Iderstine Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 771 (1939).
326
N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344
(1941).
827
N.L.R.A., § 10(c).
328
International Assn. of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 3II U.S. 72, 61 S. Ct. 83
(1940). It can order the respondent to bargain collectively with the union even
though there has been a shift in membership if it reasonably believes this is necessary
to correct prior interference. N. L. R. B. v. P. Lorillard & Co., 314 U. S. 512, 62
S. Ct. 397 (1942). But the board will not grant the injunction where all but minor
findings have been found unsupported. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1940) II5 F: (2d) 414.
829 N. L. R. A., § IO (c). This is not a common-law action resulting in a money
judgment but a statutory action and therefore is not a denial of jury trial. N. L. R. B.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
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withdraw recognition from a dominated union 330 even though this
forces him to break his contract with that union,881 and the order will
not become -invalid by the respondent's subsequent compliance.882 The
order cannot compel an employer to post notices that it will cease and
desist the unfair labor practices; this would be like compelling him to
make an admission of a crime. It can compel him to post copies of the
order and a statement that he will comply.888
The order cannot bind any one who was not a party to the
proceedings, but it may affect those who are not parties m in case of
withdrawing recognition of dominated unions or reinstatement of
employees wrongfully discharged.885
I.

The Scope of the Order

It is elementary that the order should not prohibit practices which
are not proved at the hearing 386 except in so far as absolutely necessary
to effectuate the policies of the act. The rule here need not be as strict
as in legal proceedings, where the effect of the judgment is to work
an immediate injury, for the order, unless it be for affirmative action,
is only to cease and desist from illegal activities. However, if a petition
of enforcement is granted by the court, the respondent then becomes
liable to contempt proceedings without a hearing before the board.
Therefore, the orders should be restricted to matters related to those
proved at the hearing.
Regardless of these principles, the board issued blanket orders
prohibiting respondents from "in any manner" interfering with the
employee's rights guaranteed by the act.387 Some of the courts upheld
380

N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 272, 57 S. Ct. 577

(1938).
831
National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U.S. 350, 60 S. Ct. 569 (1940).
The respondent can set up the board's order as a defense in any suit on the contract.
882
N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571
( 1938).
888
N. L. R. B. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 126 F.
(2d) 883; N. L. R. B. v. Louisville Refining Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d)
678; Virginia Ferry Corp. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) ror F. (2d) 103.
384
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206
(1938); N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d)
97.
885
See supra, p. 604.
386
N. L. R. B. v. West Kentucky Coal Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) 116 F. (2d)
8 16 (order to bargain collectively cannot be enforced where there has been no showing
of a refusal to bargain collectively).
•
887
"In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in
exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, to join, or assist labor organiza-
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the use of this blanket order where the evidence was only of a single
species of violationJ888 These decisions were based on the mystifying
logic that since sections 8 (2) (domination), 8 (3) (discrimination for
union activities), 8 ( 4) ( discrimination for testifying), and 8 ( 5) { refusal to bargain), were all species of the unfair labor practices in 8 ( r)
(interference, restraint, or coercion in exercise of the rights guaranteed), then the finding of a violation of any other one constituted a
violation of 8 (r). This then would ·be grounds for a general order.889
This ,might result in an employer being cited for contempt for discrimination on an order based solely on the unrelated finding of refusal
to bargain collectively. Ultimately this would mean that an employer
need be found guilty of only one violation and ever after he would be
liable for contempt for any conduct that might be found to be in violation of the act. This ob~iously fallacious position was denied by the Supreme Court, which held that the order could prohibit only those
acts which the employer is found to have committed or ones closely
related thereto.840 The finding of discriminatory discharges,841 or domination of company unions,3 42 or refusal to bargain collectively,848 or
interference with the right of self-organization 844 will not justify a
blanket order, but any of these findings will justify an order to cease
and desist from all acts within that category. However, where there
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid and protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act." This will be termed the
blanket order.
888
N. L. R. B. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) n4 F. (2d)
376 (evidence only of aiding a company union); N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg.
Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) IIO F. (2d) 632 (evidence only of refusal to bargain collectively).
889
Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) uo F. (2d)
148.
840
N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 61 S. Ct. 693
(1941). Globe Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 91.
841
N. L. R. B. v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 120 F.
(2d) 262. Wilson Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 845, is
seemingly contrary, but the court futilely tries to make it square with N. L. R. B. v.
Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 61 S. Ct. 693 (1940).
842
Wilson & Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 123 F. (2d) 4u; N. L.
R. B. v.. Youngstown Mines Corp., (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) 123 F. (2d) 178; N. L. R.
B. v. Continental Oil Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 120.
348
Singer Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) u9 F. (2d) 131.
Globe Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 91.
844
N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 118 F. (2d)
780.
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has been more than a single type of violation constituting a whole
course of conduct in violation of the act, a blanket order will be
sustained. M 5
An order may run against a successor to the respondent where there
has been no real transfer, but it cannot run against a good faith successor. Therefore an order against "respondent, agents, successors, and
assigns" is too broad and the last three words must be struck.846
No hard and fast rule can be formulated for the determination of
the proper breadth of the order, but it must depend on the circumstances of each case. The order should not prohibit practices which
have not been in issue at the hearing, yet it should be sufficiently broad
to prevent the respondent from evading it by a slight change in
methods. It should prohibit all those acts which the board reasonably
believes from the evidence that the respondent might commit in the
near future.
CONCLUSION

As was stated in the introduction, it is not within the scope of this
paper to evaluate the practical procedure of the board in typical cases
but to determine the limitations within the established procedure which
mark the boundaries of fairness. The results reached by the board
and the courts have been criticized in respect to the specific problems
involving necessary parties, bias of the trial examiner, issuance of subpoenas, requirement of an intermediate report, use of subordinates,
test of substantial evidence, weight of conflicting and hearsay evidence,
credibility of witnesses, and the scope of the order. It is unnecessary to
restate here the principles involved in those discussions.
However, there are some broader observations and evaluations
that should be made of the procedure as a whole.
The board is charged with the task of alleviating a major social
conflict between two groups, capital and labor, which have been tradi845
Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 922;
N. L. R. B. v. Bradley Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 768; N. L.
R. B. v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 39; N. L. R.
B. v. Reynolds Wire Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 627; N. L. R. B. v.
Entwistle Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 532; N. L. R. B. v. National
Motor Bearing Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 652. But see N. L. R. B. v.
Stone, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 752 (findings of domination, making of
individual contracts with invalid provisions, and coercive letters to workers did not
justify a blanket order).
840
N. L. R. B. v. Stone, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 752; N. L. R. B. v.
Bachelder, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 387.
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tional enemies. The board came into existence concurrently with an
upheaval in the labor movement and an outbreak of industrial unrest.
It has been able to settle ninety per cent of the cases coming before it
without formal proceedings and adjudication. The remaining ten per
cent in which there must be a hearing are those in· which there is an
irreconcilable disagreement often accompanied by high emotional tensions. The board is charged with adjudicating between these parties
in a way that will effectuate the purposes of the act and, if possible,
pacify the parties.
It is evident that no matter how the board conducts itself in this
situation it will receive severe criticism from the losing side. Since
criticism of the underlying purposes is relatively unpopular and of
little a'i[ail, most of the criticism is directed at the procedure of the
board. It is important, therefore, because of the nature of the conflict
involved, and because of the inevitable criticism, that the board establish and enforce every safeguard possible which will not too greatly
hinder its effectiveness. It must do everything possible to make the
parties feel that they have had a fair and equal chanc:e to present their
case. This has not been done.
The board has assumed an attitude, especially in purely procedural
matters, that it will refuse to reverse unless there is some definite proof
of prejudice, and this requirement of proof is almost always placed on
the 'respondent because he is the one who claims injury. If the board
fails to comply with procedure set out in the act or in its own rules, the
respondent must prove injury, but if the respondent fails to follow the
rules even in insubstantial matters, his attempted action may be disregarded by the board. There is no need to impose upon administrative
tribunals all the procedural technicalities that have hindered the courts,
but the relaxation of restrictions should apply equally to both parties.
Theories of proof of injury should not fall to such a large degree on
the respondent. If the board fails to comply with its own rules, then
the burden should be upon it to prove that such noncompliance did not
result in any unfairness.
'·
The parties will never believe they have had a fair hearing unless
they feel they have had an opportunity to present their case to the ones
who decide. The whole hearing stage is not for the purpose of rendering a decision but merely to compile a record from which the board
can make its decision. This indirect method of presenting evidence to
the tribunal is not conducive to creating in the parties a feeling that
they have had a fair chance to present their case.
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This feeling of distrust is increased by the fact that the ones who
decide never personally consider the record which has been so carefully
prepared. The board considers only abstracts of the record made by
subordinates and these abstracts may be colored by the review attorney's personal bias in the case. While the board is making its decision
based on mere abstracts of the record, briefs, and oral arguments, the
trial examiner who compiled the record, heard all of the evidence personally, observed all of the witnesses, and heard all of the arguments
on motions and issues, has no voice in the final determination except
to the extent that his recommendations in the intermediate report are
accepted. He is in the best position to render a proper decision and
should be given that power with the board having only the right to
review on appeal. This would allow all parties an opportunity to present their evidence directly to the one who decides, would lend an
atmosphere of dignity and importance to the hearing, and would eliminate the whole problem of the review section.
There is some justification in the court's readiness to overthrow
the findings of the board, for the court has all the information before
it which the board has, is as familiar with the issues as the board, and
in many cases probably makes a more complete personal revieyv of the
record. If the decision were made by the trial examiner, the court
would have less justification in overthrowing the findings because of
the trial examiner's personal familiarity with many aspects of the case
which could not be reflected in the record.
Fair procedure before the board requires not only that the parties
should be protected against proven prejudice but should be protected
against probable prejudice even though none can be proved. The nature of the conflict being adjudicated demands strict safeguards to give
the parties confidence in the tribunal's procedure and a satisfaction
that they have had a fair chance to be heard.

